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NOTES AND COMMENTS
COMPETITIVE BIDDING UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The Robinson-Patman Act1 (the Act) was designed to eliminate
illegal price discrimination and thereby to promote active price com-
petition.2 In practice, however, it has often yielded results which are
disturbingly anticompetitive,3 eliciting widespread criticism and the
frequent charge that the Act is essentially a price-fixing statute mas-
querading in "anti-monopoly and pro-competition symbols. ' 4 Nowhere
is this more evident than in the context of competitive bidding.
Consider the Robinson-Patman problems posed when a buyer
seeks to purchase goods by inviting sellers to bid for his business. If a
seller bids a price lower than that which he charges other buyers, a
competitor of the seller may be able to establish a prima facie case un-
der the Act. Moreover, the seller may find the "meet-competition" de-
fense unavailable to him, since the object of bidding is to "beat" and
not merely to "meet" the competition.5 If the seller is aware of his
competitor's bid and then bids a lower price, the requisite good faith
needed for a meet-competition defense may be lacking. On the other
hand, if the bidding is sealed, the seller is deprived of the argument
that the price cut was in response to the competitor's low bid.
Permutations of these rather simple examples produce equally
complex and uncertain results. Thus, utilization of the seemingly pur-
est form of competition, i.e., bidding, may place the unwitting seller
in a quagmire of potential liability. This Note will outline these diffi-
culties and suggest modes of avoiding Robinson-Patman liability in
bidding.
THE ACT
Prior to its amendment by the Robinson-Patman Act, section 2 of
the Clayton Act of 19146 sought to eliminate territorial price discrim-
115 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
2W. PATMAN, COMPLETE GuIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 2 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as PATMAN].
3 See Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77
YAL LJ. 70 (1967).
4 1 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPLITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
§ 28.1(a), at 951 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CALLmAN].
5 See, e.g., National Dairy Prods. Corp. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,656 (FEC 1966), aff'd, 395 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968). See
text accompanying notes 18-21 & 110-25 infra.
6 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
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inations practiced by large firms.7 At the outset, strict judicial con-
struction of the Clayton Act limited its protection to competitors of
the discriminatory seller and not to injured buyers.8 With the disrup-
tion of the traditional manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer marketing
structure, caused by the advent of large chain stores, Congress recog-
nized the need to protect small buyers who lacked the purchasing
power to command price concessions, and who were left at a competi-
tive disadvantage. 9 In response to this need, the Robinson-Patman Act
was adopted.' 0
Simply stated, section 2(a)1 now prohibits a seller from charging
7 See C. EDwARDs, THE PRCE DISCRIMINATION LAW 5 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
EDWARDS]. See also PATMAN, supra note 2, at 7.
When faced with troublesome local competition, a large firm frequently resorted to
territorial price discrimination. Its prices in the particular area would be lowered to such
a point that the local competitor's share of the market was significantly reduced, if not
eliminated. The profit loss sustained during this price war would be subsidized by profits
the large firm realized in its other markets, its so-called "war chest" or "treasury."
[ihe treasury used to finance the warfare is drawn from interstate, as well as
local, sources ... and the prices on interstate sales .. .are kept high while the
local prices are lowered. . . .The profits made in interstate activities would
underwrite the losses of local price-cutting campaigns.
Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 119 (1954).
8 Initially, the language of § 2 was strictly construed by the Second Circuit, which
limited its application to competitive injury between sellers. Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288
F. 774 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923); accord, National Biscuit Co. v. FTC,
299 F. 733 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 613 (1925). In 1929, however, the Supreme
Court rejected this interpretation and extended the Act's protection to buyers. George
Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929). In so holding, the Court
was required to ignore the Act's legislative history and rely upon the "dear language"
of the section.
Despite the extension of protection to buyers, enforcement of the Act was still
crippled by the exception for quantity (volume) discounts which were not required to
be cost justified. Although all buyers would theoretically realize similar savings under
the mass purchasing plans which were then offered, very few could take advantage of
the savings by taking delivery in large quantities. The discrimination was thus cloaked
in an apparently equitable program which was beyond the reach of the Act. See E.
KITNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PIMER 7-8 (1970) [hereinafter cited as KrTNER]. See also
EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 6-7; PATmAN, supra note 2, at 9-10.
9 Section 2 of the Clayton Act could not meet new developments in distribution
whereby the traditional middleman was eliminated. Large chain stores realized cost sav-
ings by buying directly from the manufacturer, demanding a price reduction equal to
the regular brokerage fees avoided by the seller. These savings were then either passed
on to the consumer in the form of lower retail prices or used to finance advertising. In
either event, this placed the independent retailer at a marketing disadvantage, for he
could only purchase through a wholesaler and thus could not enjoy similar savings.
See C. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
AC" 4-11 (2d rev. ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as AuSTIN]. See generally EDWARDS, supra
note 7, at 21; PATMAN, supra note 2, at 1.
10 The original Patman bill, as was anticipated at the time, met with strong oppo-
sition from lobbyists representing large chain stores. Thus, the resulting Robinson-Patman
Act "represents extensive legislative compromise," and as a consequence is not a "hall-
mark of clarity." KrTNER, supra note 8, at 14. Indeed, much of the ensuing confusion
over the years has resulted from occasional misinterpretations by the courts.
11 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970) provides in part:
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different prices to different purchasers, other than governmental and
nonprofit institutions,12 unless the differential reflects actual savings
to the seller. Such savings may be related to the cost of manufacturing,
selling, or delivering under the circumstances of a particular sale, or
may result from a change in the marketability of the goods, e.g., deterio-
ration of perishable items, seasonal obsolescence, or discontinuance. 3
As the Act is concerned solely with the sale of commodities, the
realm of its protection is necessarily restricted. For example, a recent
district court holding places the usual building and construction con-
tract beyond the Act's scope since the dominant purpose of such an
agreement is not the sale of goods.14 Thus, one major industry which
heavily relies on the practice of competitive bidding is, in most in-
stances, immune from any charge of price discrimination.
To establish a prima facie case under the Act, the following ele-
ments must be shown:
(1) two or more sales transactions reasonably close in time;
(2) of commodities of like grade and quality;
(3) with different prices;
(4) to two or more purchasers;
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such com-
modities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or
any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or
other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect
of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit
of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them ....
12Sales to federal or state governments or their agencies are not subject to the
provisions of the Act. Thus, there is no prohibition against sales to governmental pur-
chasers at lower, discriminatory prices. See 1 TRADE REG. REP. 8275 (1971), citing
General Shale Prods. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 87 F. Supp. 598 (D. Ky. 1941), afj'd
on other grounds, 182 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942) (sales to a federal agency) and Sachs v.
Brown Forman Distiller Corp., 134 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 1956 TRADE CAs.
68,396 (2d Cir.) (sales to a state agency). Section 2c of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1c (1970),
exempts purchases by nonprofit institutions of supplies for their own use.
1a 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970) provides in part:
[N]othing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting
from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered. . . . And provided further, That nothing herein
contained shall prevent price changes from time to time where in response to
changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods
concerned, such as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of per-
ishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process,
or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned.
14 Ideal Plumbing Co. v. Benco, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1161 (W.D. Ark. 1974).
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(5) satisfying the interstate commerce requirements; 15 and
(6) which result or may result in competitive injury.16
Once these elements have been successfully demonstrated, the burden
shifts to the accused party to proceed with affirmative proof that the
discrimination was either cost justified or due to changing conditions.'7
An additional affirmative defense is set forth in section 2(b),'8 the so-
called "meet-competition" defense, which permits a seller to rebut a
charge of illegal price discrimination "by showing that his lower price
... was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a com-
petitor ... ."1 As interpreted by the Supreme Court in FTC v. A. E.
Staley Manufacturing Co.,20 the good faith requirement necessitates a
showing of existing facts that "would lead a reasonable and prudent
person to believe that the granting of a lower price would in fact meet
the equally low price of a competitor."21
A buyer may incur liability under section 2(f)22 by inducing his
seller to part with goods at a discriminatory price. Section 2(f) makes
it unlawful for a buyer engaged in commerce "knowingly to induce or
receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section." 23
While this provision has been largely dormant in the past, in recent
years there has been a marked change in the attitude of the Federal
15 In a recent holding, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Act's coverage is
less than the broad jurisdictional scope which Congress can authorize under the com-
merce clause, as exemplified by § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
Essentially, the Robinson-Patman Act is applicable only to
persons or activities within the flow of interstate commerce- the practical, eco-
nomic continuity in the generation of goods and services for interstate markets
and their transport and distribution to the consumer.. . . IThe jurisdictional
requirements of these provisions cannot be satisfied merely by showing that
allegedly anti-competitive acquisitions and activities affect commerce.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974). The Court stated that
Congress purposely limited the reach of the Act, and, even if the legislative intent
were ambiguous, four decades of judicial interpretations have rejected the "effects on
commerce" approach. Id. at 401.
16 See KrEnm, supra note 8, at 25. See also D. BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr
SUAR Y AND CommENT 6-14 (1964).
17See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 384 US. 37, 44-45 (1948); CALLMAN, supra note 4,
§ 28.1(c), at 997.
1815 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970).
19rd. See AusrmN, supra note 9, at 82; D. BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Aar SoAr-
MARY AND ComwN.Tr 29 (1964); EDWARS, supra note 7, at 546; 4 J. VON KALNOWSKI, AZrI-
musr LAWS AND TRADE REGULATON § 82.02 et seq. (1971) [hereinafter cited as yoN KAIs-
Nows.I].
20824 U.S. 746 (1945).
211 d. at 760.
2215 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1970).
28 Id.
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Trade Commission (FTC) toward buyer liability, and stricter enforce-
ment can be anticipated.24
BIDDING AND PRICE HAGGLING
The term "competitive bidding," as herein employed, encompasses
the entire spectrum of price negotiations present whenever a number
of sellers are competing for the business of a single buyer. The style of
bidding to be analyzed will typically arise in a buyer's market, one in
which the seller's pricing will be sensitive to buyer pressure. Generally,
the market will be highly competitive, with the competition centering
primarily on price. Excluded from this discussion are bids based on
established list prices, or justified by cost savings, volume or other
considerations.
The few instances in which a court has been called upon to define
competitive bidding usually have involved the construction of a mu-
nicipal ordinance which has mandated its use. In this context, the term
has been held to require due advertising, an opportunity to bid on the
same undertaking, and equal treatment of all bidders.25 The procedures
used in commercial practice are generally less structured. In fact, the
phrase has been used in a Robinson-Patman context to refer to situa-
tions where the buyer has merely requested informal price quotations
from a number of sellers.26
Other preliminary definitions are in order. For the purposes of
this discussion, "sealed" or "blind bidding" may be described as the
submission of a price offer at the invitation of the buyer without any
specific information regarding the offers of competing sellers. At the
other extreme, there is the practice which may be described as "hag-
gling," "secret concessions," 27 or "catch-as-catch-can" 28 pricing. As used
herein, haggling denotes a process whereby the buyer attempts to ob-
tain the lowest selling price from one of a number of sellers by utilizing
the price quote of one seller as leverage against another. On occasion,
24 See Hearings on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act Before the Special
Subcomm. on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of the Select Comm. on
Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 3, at 831 (1970).
25 See Sterrett v. Bell, 240 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
26 See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. q 19,045
(FTC 1969).
27 As opposed to utilizing standard discounting procedures, secret concessions repre-
sent a practice whereby a seller offers "haphazard" individual prices in a particular market
in order to attract certain business accounts. 5 voN KALINOWSI, supra note 19, § 29.04
n.2.
28The practice of offering secret concessions has also been referred to as "catch-as-
catch-can" pricing. EDWARDs, supra note 7, at 468-85.
[Vol. 49:512
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the FTC has referred to this type of hard bargaining as "competitive
bidding."2 9
Independent of the form in which the bargaining is conducted is
the eligibility of a seller to enter the competition for the buyer's
business. A buyer may invite only certain sellers to submit bids, a pro-
cedure normally referred to as "closed bidding."30 In an "open bidding"
situation, on the other hand, any supplier may submit an offer.
The argument has been raised that because of the beneficial and
procompetitive effects of bidding, price discriminations in that context
should be excluded from the prohibitions of the Act. The trial examiner
in Quaker Oats Co.,31 an FTC proceeding, was faced with that very
question. The respondent, Quaker Oats, was charged with discriminat-
ing in price between different purchasers of its oat flour. The complaint
charged that Quaker Oats sold to some processors at prices substantially
lower than those charged others for a product of like grade and quality.
No formal price lists were ever employed by Quaker Oats. Instead,
purchasers of oat flour would contact two or more suppliers and request
bids for specific quantities. Quaker Oats generally submitted prices in
response to such bid requests, and the contracts usually would be
awarded to the lowest bidder.3 2
The examiner found that the flour was of like grade and quality
and that none of the price differentials could be cost justified.33 How-
ever, despite a few sales below cost, which were held to be the result
of miscalculations, the examiner found no evidence of predatory in-
tent.3 4 Next, questioning whether the industry-wide practice of com-
petitive bidding for sales contracts removed the case from Robinson-
Patman applicability, he noted:
The evidence is uncontradicted that competitive bidding to the
manufacturer customers of Quaker is entrenched as a custom in
the industry despite the few exceptions. It is also dear that there
29 Beatrice Foods Co. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE Rw. REP. 19,045 (FTC
1969).
30 There are a variety of reasons why a buyer may decide to restrict the bidding
to certain suppliers. At the most basic level, the buyer may have preferences for several
firms with which he has previously dealt or of which he has received favorable reports.
In other instances, the buyer's needs may require adherence to a strict list of specifications
regarding, among other factors, quality and quantity of the desired goods. This invari-
ably tends to limit the bidding to certain suppliers.
3166 F.T.C. 1131 (1964).
82 Id. at 1141-42.
33 Id. at 1159-61.
84 Id. at 1162-65. For a discussion of predatory intent, see text accompanying notes
52-57 infra.
19751
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is a shifting floor under the bidding, i.e. the market price of oats.
Under such circumstances we are inclined to agree with the counsel
for respondent that we must reconcile the Robinson-Patman Act
and the Federal Trade Act "with the broader antitrust policies
that have been laid down by Congress" by dismissing the com-
plaint, unless it be shown that the competitive bidding carried
on by Quaker was a mere cloak for discrimination between cus-
tomers. Reading the Clayton Act to be sure that it is administered
in a manner consistent with the Sherman Act would tend toward
the approval of any plan so apparently productive of competi-
tion. For, the Sherman Act was specifically designed to protect
competition against unreasonable restraints.
No one objects to the consumer insisting that his suppliers
bid against one another. Bids to meet competition are expressly
authorized under the Robinson-Patman Act. That does not mean,
however, that suppliers under the guise of offering competitive
bids may favor one customer over another. If this is such a favor-
ing of one customer over another it makes no difference that in
form there was competitive bidding.3 5
The examiner found that Quaker Oats regularly favored one cus-
tomer, Gerber Products Company, by providing it with lower prices
for its oat flour, and by so doing, undercut Quaker Oats' main rival
for the business, National Oats Company. Consequently, Quaker Oats
was held to have conducted a discriminatory pricing campaign designed
to injure competition. Moreover, the respondent was deemed to have
failed to establish the requisite good faith necessary for the meet-
competition defense.
Quaker so underpriced National in its competition for Gerber
that National just was unable to remain in the running.... Such
conduct, therefore, both colors Quaker's bidding practices with-
drawing them from their character of good faith competitive bid-
ding and itself constitutes an unfair competitive practice, which,
if continued by a company so disproportionately well financed in
comparison with smaller competitors that it will eventually, in the
normal course, drive the latter out of business.36
Accordingly, a cease and desist order was entered to prevent Quaker
Oats from further price discrimination.
In reaching his decision, the trial examiner expressly provided that
nothing would prevent Quaker from engaging in good faith competitive
bidding "in any industry in which the practice of buying oat flour
under that system has been established ... ."37 Furthermore, the opinion
85 66 F.T.C. at 1174-75.
86 Id. at 1177.
87id. at 1183.
[Vol. 49:512
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outlined the definition of bad faith bidding to include (1) prices to
particular customers which are consistently lower than those to others
who are in competition with the favored buyers, unless they can be
justified, and (2) prices which fail to reflect either actual cost of sale
or the estimated costs, whichever is higher.88
Despite the hearing examiner's well-reasoned opinion, the Com-
mission set aside the findings and dismissed the complaint for failure
to establish the necessary causative link, i.e., that the price differentials
produced, or were likely to produce, an adverse effect on competition.89
While not rejecting the trial examiner's views on bidding, the Com-
mission's reversal on other grounds has no doubt weakened their impact.
Nevertheless, Quaker Oats represents the most significant attempt to
reconcile the salutary features of competitive bidding with the Act's
ban upon discriminatory pricing. Its basic conclusion is that bidding
will not be given categorical treatment under the Act. Rather, the
statutory and judicial elements of both the prima facie case and the
defenses thereunder must be applied to the specific fact situation in
which the discriminatory bid was made. The balance of this Note will
examine the relationship between these elements and the fact patterns
that frequently arise in the context of bidding.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND COMPETITIVE INJURY:
ESTABLISHING A NExUs
Injury to Competition
In order to establish a prima facie case under the Act, the FTC or
a private party plaintif 40 must prove an adverse effect on competition.
Unlike price discrimination, which may be established simply by show-
ing a difference in price charged to two purchasers, 41 proof of injury
to competition is not as easily demonstrated. A generally adverse effect
on competition must be shown, not merely an isolated instance of price
discrimination.42 More specifically, the discrimination must tend to "in-
jure, destroy, or prevent competition. '43
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1191-93.
40 See note 84 infra.
41 See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960).
42 See Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1580, 1604 (1960). The Act does not seek
to protect individual competitors as such, but rather "competition." Automatic Canteen
Co. of America v. FTC, 346 US. 61, 63 (1953). It attempts to prevent the "substantial
impairment of the vigor or health of the contest for business, regardless of which com-
petitor wins or loses." Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 1961).
However, while the elimination of a competitor is not by itself significant, it is relevant
as a "necessary inddent" of competitive injury. CALLMN, supra note 4, § 28.1(b)(7), at
970.
4315 US.C. § 13(a) (1970).
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Since the Act was created to prevent illegal conduct in its incipi-
ence, 44 a showing of potential competitive injury will suffice. In this
regard, two tests have been employed by the courts. In Corn Products
Refining Co. v. FTC,45 the Supreme Court held that the Act merely
required a showing of a reasonable possibility of injury -that an ad-
verse effect on competition could occur.46 However, this overly inclu-
sive test has been modified and replaced by a requirement of a
reasonable probability of injury, i.e., that an adverse effect is likely to
occur.
4 7
Once price discrimination and actual or probable competitive in-
jury are established, the final task is to prove that a causal nexus exists
between the two. The illegal price discrimination must be responsi-
ble for the injury. Occasionally a seller may successfully defend against
a Robinson-Patman charge by demonstrating that the injury to com-
petition was due to such extraneous factors as internal problems,
changes of competitors, 4 an intensely competitive market,49 advertis-
ing and selling campaigns, and the like. Analysis of these possible de-
fenses requires the familiar division of injury to competition into two
categories: primary-line- injury to a competitor of the seller, and
secondary-line - injury to a competitor of the buyer.50
Primary-Line Considerations
Traditionally, it has been more difficult to establish injury on the
seller's own line of competition.51 The plaintiff, whether the Govern-
4 4 See PATmAN, supra note 2, at 47-48.
45 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
46 Id. at 742.
47 See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605, 616 (7th Cir. 1969); United
Biscuit Co. of America v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615, 622 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
926 (1966); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 959 (1965); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 843 (7th Cir. 1961); Balian
Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 368 (9th Cir. 1955); Quaker Oats Co.,
66 F.T.C. 1131, 1191 (1964).
48 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 839 (7th Cir. 1961).
49 Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 368 (9th Cir. 1955).
5o In addition, there is "tertiary-line injury" which is suffered by customers of the
unfavored buyer. See generally KrrNER, supra note 8, at 22. It is not, however, relevant
to the purposes of this discussion.
51 At the primary level, inferences of competitive injury will not be permitted merely
upon a showing of a significant price differential. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC,
289 F.2d 835, 840-41 (7th Cir. 1961); Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil 8- Ref. Co., 224
F. Supp. 922, 925 (D.N.J. 1963); Keck, Lawful Price Discrimination: "Where There Is
No Unlawful Effect on Competition," 8 ANrusr BULL. 381, 896-402 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Keck]. This difficulty in proving injury is not found at the buyer's level, since
secondary-line analysis "permits wide inferences of adverse competitive effects based on
the existence of substantial price differentials." Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372, 1379
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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ment or a private party, must prove that the adverse effects on compe-
tition resulted from price discriminations and not from a multitude of
other factors affecting competition among sellers. Since direct evidence
of causation will often be difficult to establish, courts have occasionally
settled upon evidence of predatory intent as a substitute. 52 The intent,
and in turn the causation, are inferred from the seller's conduct de-
signed to undermine the competitive power of another seller. Sales be-
low cost,5 3 drastic undercutting of a competitor's price over a prolonged
period,54 and nonpricing anticompetitive practices 5 are among the ju-
dicially accepted indicia of predatory intent.
Where bidding is the general mode of purchasing in a given mar-
ket, a pattern of illegal price discrimination will be easily discernible
since each transaction is essentially unique. In such instances, the seller
may abandon his usual list price - if he has one - and work on a
cost-plus profit approach. If his bids are consistently lower when a par-
ticular competing seller is involved in the contest, this may constitute
evidence of predatory intent when considered in light of other fac-
tors.56 The offending seller may be unwilling to submit unprofitable
bids when bidding against sellers who do not pose realistic competitive
threats. However, when the targeted competitor is bidding for the
business, the predatory seller may make an unprofitable and discrimi-
natory bid which is primarily designed to prevent the other seller from
obtaining the contract. Clearly, evidence of this type of conduct should
suffice to establish the needed causative link.57
52 See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960); Balian Ice Cream Co. v.
Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955). Cf. National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC,
412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1969).
53 See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1969); CALL i%-,
supra note 4, § 28.1(b)(7), at 971. A bid below cost permits an inference that it was
supported by extra-territorial profits. Such a finding supplies the needed causation in
a primary-line case. See Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 224 F. Supp.
922, 926 (D.NJ. 1963).
54 See, e.g., Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 871 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966); Maryland
Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957). See Keck, supra note 51, at 402 n.57.
55 See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967) (engaging
in industrial espionage); E.B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 1944)
(continually disparaging competitor's products while falsely representing one's own);
Bergjans Farm Dairy Co. v. Sanitary Milk Producers, 241 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Mo. 1965),
afl'd, 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966) (attempting to monopolize a market by conspiring to
fix prices and by following a plan which ultimately resulted in the acquisition of a
second processing plant).
50 Other factors to consider in determining whether predatory intent exists are (1)
relative size and strength of the competitors; (2) whether elimination of the competitor
would lead to a monopoly for the discriminatory seller; and (3) whether the low prices
were subsidized by profits earned elsewhere. See Keck, supra note 51, at 402 n.57.
57 As will later be examined, the discriminating seller may, nevertheless, be able to
establish a meet-competition defense. See text accompanying notes 94-140 infra.
1975]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In markets where bidding for the business of the buyer is the ex-
ception and not the rule, an injured seller will not have a record of
past experiences from which to demonstrate this pattern of discrimina-
tion. Yet, whether bidding is generally or infrequently utilized, the
loss of a single contract, if large enough, may have a considerable
impact upon competition. In such instances, a Robinson-Patman vio-
lation could conceivably be charged.
One court has employed a pragmatic test to determine the anti-
competitive effects of the loss of a single customer through price dis-
crimination practiced by the seller's competitor. Borrowing from the
standard used in territorial discrimination cases,58 the district court in
Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 9 held that, in a
bidding contest, the test for causation is whether higher bids to other
customers subsidized the discriminatory low bid. In Shore Gas, gaso-
line suppliers engaged in bidding for the business of governmental
and commercial accounts by offering discounts from posted consumer
prices. The Asbury Park Radio Cab Company, which had been a com-
mercial customer of Shore, the plaintiff, entered into a contract with
Humble, the defendant, after the latter offered a price reduction
greater than that given other purchasers. Subsequently, Shore charged
Humble with violating the Act and brought an action for treble dam-
ages.
Despite the defendant's concession that its price to the cab com-
pany was discriminatory, Humble was nonetheless absolved from lia-
bility since its lower price was self-sufficient and nonsubsidized.
When a seller underbids a competitor, thereby injuring him, the
injury is an "effect" of the discrimination only if the low price is
supported by other prices and their profits, wherever charged.
Otherwise, the low price alone has caused the injury and the price
discrimination is but incidental.... If the price is completely self-
sufficient, it may be inferred that no relationship between high and
low prices exists, and therefore that the discrimination had not
the proscribed "effect." s0
As enunciated by the court, for a violation of the Act to exist, there
must be a correlation between the low bid which is the basis of the
58See, e.g., Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 119 (1954); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 839, 842 (7th Cir. 1961). For a discussion of the "war
chest" theory, see note 7 supra.
59 224 F. Supp. 922 (D.N.J. 1963).
60 Id. at 926.
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suit and higher bids to other purchasers. 61 High prices provide the
profit margins necessary to undercut the competition.62
In applying this "deep pocket" or "war chest" theory to competi-
tive bidding, the court made available a significant body of case law
developed with respect to territorial price discrimination disputes.63
Furthermore, by focusing on the predatory practice of subsidization,
the otherwise positive aspects of competitive bidding are not unduly
restricted. The court emphasized the pro-competitive features of the
bidding system and felt that sustaining the plaintiff's case would "ren-
der impractical the only meaningful price competition in which Shore,
Humble, and other rivals are presently engaged." 64 The existence of
"secret concessions"6 in the bidding procedure, i.e., downward adjust-
ments of bids based on knowledge of a competitor's offer, in no way
troubled the court. Indeed, the court emphasized pragmatic market
considerations by conceding that, where there are a limited number
of suppliers offering a standardized product, "secret concession" pric-
ing is perhaps the only effective type of price competition available.66
Further borrowing from territorial cases, the Shore Gas court
noted that the presence of any injury to competition may have re-
sulted from the nature of the market.67 A highly competitive market
often forces a seller to reduce his bid. Therefore, any injury sustained
is not the result of the seller's price reduction but rather is the product
of that fierce competition. s Still, if the plaintiff was to establish that
defendant's low bids were responsible for the downward pressure on
the price structure in the market, thus eroding competition, a finding
of a sufficient nexus would seem appropriate. 69
61 Id. at 925.
02 Id.
63 See, e.g., Moore v. Mlead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Atlas Bldg. Prods.
Co. v. Diamond Block 8= Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 843 (1960); Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957); H.J. Heinz
v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See note 7 supra.
64 224 F. Supp. at 928.
65 See note 27 supra.
66 224 F. Supp. at 927.
67id. at 926-27.
68 The court in Shore Gas relied heavily upon Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms
Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), a territorial price discrimination case. In Balian, the
plaintiffs revenue loss was held to be attributable solely to the presence of a highly
competitive market. The fact that several ice cream suppliers charged higher prices out-
side the Los Angeles area was alone insufficient to prove primary-line injury to the ice
cream market in that city. No evidence existed that these extraterritorial prices were
subsidizing the lower Los Angeles prices. The price differences "did not substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in ice cream products." Id. at 368.
69 See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). In this non-
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Secondary-Line Injury
At the customer level there is a greater risk of liability for price
discrimination, for here, broad inferences of buyer injury will be made
from a permanent and substantial price difference. 70 In Shore Gas, for
example, the court noted the trend toward a per se approach in sec-
ondary-line cases:
In the common "secondary" or buyer's line injury case, the causal
relationship between discrimination and injury to competition is
obvious: defendant's difference in price to buyers places the one
discriminated against at a competitive, disadvantage, consequently
prejudicing fair, vigorous competition in the affected market.71
Despite the inferences of injury which are permitted in the sec-
ondary-line cases, certain market analysis is nevertheless necessary.72
First, there must be a competitive relationship between those custom-
ers receiving the different prices. 73 Second, the competitive injury and
bidding case, the Court held that the practice of offering discriminatory prices was
responsible for the downward pressure on the price structure in the Salt Lake City
market and, in so eroding competition, was in violation of § 2(a). Yet, for all intents
and purposes, the competition in the market appeared to have improved. Plaintiff's
market share decreased from a quasi-monopolistic 66.5% to a still commanding 45.3%,
but its sales volume actually increased.
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, criticized the majority for misreading the Act in such
manner as to provide protection to individual competitors and refute the generally held
notion that "lower prices are the hallmark of intensified competition." Id. at 706. Four-
teen years earlier, the Court had held that to construe the Act as protecting individual
competitors at the expense of public injury would give rise to price uniformity "in
open conflict with other purposes of the antitrust legislation." Automatic Canteen Co.
of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63 (1953). Apparently, in Utah Pie, the Court refused
to view higher retail prices as evidencing public injury. For a detailed critique of this
decision see Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case,
77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967).
70 See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 45 (1948); Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d
1372, 1379 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
71 Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 224 F. Supp. 922, 925 (D.N.J. 1963).
The ready inference of injury on the secondary-line is also made by the FTC.
[I]t is clear that the mere existence of substantial differentials between compet-
ing purchasers in a price sensitive atmosphere is sufficient to give rise to an
inference of reasonable probability of injury to competition.
Beatrice Foods Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,045, at 21,303.
72 See Keck, supra note 51, at 407.
73 See Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 367 (9th Cir. 1955);
Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp. 248, 252 (S.D. Ala. 1971) ("There is no price
discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act if a different price is charged
to retailers who are not in competition with one another as is the case here.').
In this regard, it is essential to remain aware of functional discounts, which are
solely related to the buyer's market stratum or function. The special functions provided
by these buyers can be cost justified as savings to the seller under § 2(a). Needless to
say, the price differential must reflect an actual savings or liability will be incurred.
Furthermore, it is the actual marketing function which is singularly dispositive and not
the buyer's title. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952). See generally VON KAU-
NOWSKI, supra note 19, § 30.02[l].
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the price discrimination must be at the buyer level.74 Finally, the causal
connection between the competitive injury and the price discrimination
must be established, a task made measurably easier by the permitted
inferences.75 As is true with primary-line injury, care must be taken to
determine if the price differentials were the cause rather than the re-
sult of a specific market situation.76
With regard to secondary-line injury, a possible "no causation"
defense was suggested in Quaker Oats Co.77 There, the FTC upheld
the respondent's pricing methods on the ground that reductions in
price of a component commodity - oat flour - had little effect on the
price of the finished product. Due to the lack of correlation between
the price of the component and the buyer's final product, the effect on
buyer level competition caused by the respondent's discriminatory bids
was too tenuous to establish the requisite causation.78
Somewhat akin to the approach taken in primary-line decisions79
is the Seventh Circuit's view in American Oil Co. v. ETC.80 The FTC's
charge of price discrimination was predicated upon a local price war
between major gasoline distributors. American had instituted a dealer
assistance program whereby it would lower its prices in order to facili-
tate effective competition between its dealers and other retailers who
were enjoying lower prices from their suppliers. The court correctly
noted that, absent a reasonable connection between the two, the mere
fact that there were adverse competitive effects and discriminatory
prices does not in and of itself establish a section 2(a) violation.8' It
concluded by holding that American Oil's dealer assistance program
74 Keck, supra note 51, at 404.
75 Inferences of injury can more easily be made in a secondary-line situation in which
there is keen competition and narrow profit margins. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372,
1378-79 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d
351 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 886 U.S. 908 (1967). Nevertheless, the Commission has
been warned by the Supreme Court to take "realistic appraisals of relevant competitive
facts" and avoid the "ri]nvocation of mechanical word formulas." FTC v. Sun Oil Co.,
371 U.S. 505, 527 (1963).
76 See American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
954 (1964).
77 66 F.T.C. 1131 (1964).
78 Id. at 1191.
79 See Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 281 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), dis-
cussed in note 68 supra.
80 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964).
81 The court noted:
[I]n addition to competitors, price discrimination, and the fact of a shift of
some business from or other adverse economic effect upon the unfavored cus-
tomers, it is essential to the establishment of the violation here charged that
there be a causal relation between the price discrimination to the favored cus-
tomers and the factor relied upon as evidencing an actual or reasonably probable
substantial lessening of ability to compete on the part of the unfavored customers.
825 F.2d at 104.
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was a result of the price war and not a cause of it.82 Once the court
found the causal connection wanting, there was no need for it to be
concerned with any meet-competition problems of not having under-
cut the competitors' prices.
It is perforce the very nature of the competitive bidding process
which encourages discriminatory price reductions. Sellers are virtually
forced to offer the lowest price feasible. This situation is arguably a
breeding ground for discriminatory prices, and may conceivably bring
many bidding cases within the ambit of the protection afforded in
American Oil. Furthermore, this downward pressure distinguishes com-
petitive bidding, in all its forms, from a mere request for a price quote.
In the latter instance, apart from the ever-present need to fall within
a competitive range, the pressure to shave prices is considerably less. 3
Notwithstanding American Oil, and in light of the inferences of causa-
tion available in secondary-line cases, sellers should exercise caution in
formulating their competitive bidding practices.
Injury to Private Party Plaintiffs
Unlike actions instituted by the FTC, the private party plaintiff
must demonstrate a causal relationship between the discriminatory
price and the injury he suffered. Furthermore, outside the Second Cir-
cuit, he will usually have the additional burden of establishing injury
to competition in general.84 Not surprisingly, various instances exist
where a supplier can demonstrate that causation was wanting on the
secondary level. This is evidenced by several territorial price discrim-
ination cases where the seller has been able to prove the favored buyer
82 Id. at 106. This decision may be contrasted to the holding in Utah Pie that down-
ward pressure on the price level may constitute substantial injury to competition. See
note 69 supra.
83 In a bidding situation, a seller is more alert to the need for shaving prices since
it is readily assumed that his price will be matched against others. He consequently
arrives at a price with his competitor's price very much in mind. Far less pressure exists
when making a formal price quote. Here, the seller is much less likely to lower his price
and more often than not will remain fairly close to list price.
84 See yoN KAIJNOWSKI, supra note 19, § 28.08. Until 1945, it was generally believed
that a prima fade case could not be established by a private plaintiff without a showing
of general injury to competition. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 135 F.2d 453 (7th Cir.
1943). The Second Circuit, however, in 1945, liberally construed § 2(b) to hold that any
price differential would constitute sufficient prima fade evidence of competitive injury.
Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 826 U.S. 734
(1945). Based upon this case and Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,
364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961), one of the authors of the Act has stated that a private litigant
need only show injury to himself resulting from the discriminatory price without the
necessity of proving injury to competition. PATMAN, supra note 2, at 52. However, a
careful reading of Radiant Burners seems to support the conclusion that its holding was
limited to § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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was not in competition with the unfavored one.8 5 Furthermore, in
Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co.,8 6 the court refused to find
a violation, emphasizing that the plaintiff was injured not by the extra-
territorial price differentials, but by the highly competitive nature of
the market, for which the plaintiff was in some part responsible.
In a bidding situation, a private plaintiff may also be denied re-
covery if a defendant's discriminatory bid is equal to bids of sellers
who could lawfully underbid the plaintiff.8 7 In such a case, a court may
well find that the defendant did not cause injury to the plaintiff. Re-
gardless of the submission of defendant's unlawful bid, the plaintiff
would not have received the desired business. Such was the holding in
General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co.,"" wherein a
building materials subcontractor brought suit against a fellow subcon-
tracting material supplier and a contractor who had been awarded a
municipal housing contract. Prior to bidding on the contract, the de-
fendant-contractor had received quotes on bricks from several firms,
among them the defendant Southern Company and the plaintiff. The
contractor persuaded Southern to lower its bid to equal those sub-
mitted by two other suppliers and then awarded Southern the subcon-
tract. Plaintiff contended, inter alia, that Southern's price reduction
destroyed the competitive price advantage that plaintiff's product en-
The Second Circuit's position has been rejected by the FTC and several circuits.
See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 1968); Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 843 (7th Cir. 1961); Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block &
Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 956 (10th Cir. 1959); Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955, 976 (1959);
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1580, 1604 (1956). This has led one respected com-
mentator to conclude:
The rule outside the Second Circuit is that the plaintiff has the affirmative
burden to prove not only a price differential, but also the other elements of a
Section 2(a) violation, including that of competitive injury; only after such ele-
ments are established is a prima facie case of illegal price discrimination made
out under the statute. Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the ques-
tion directly, it has by implication rejected the Moss approach.
VON KALrNows,, supra note 19, § 28.08.
85 See, e.g., FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 US. 505, 526-27 (1963); England v. Chrysler
Corp., 493 F.2d 269, 271-72 (9th Cir. 1974); Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp.
248, 252 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
86231 F.2d 356, 368 (9th Cir. 1955).
87 Frequentiy, a competitor, operating under lower overhead and promotional ex-
penses, can lawfully charge a buyer less for identical goods. This situation is found in
a number of Robinson-Patman cases in which a large nationwide firm sought to compete
with a small, local company, which, due to either efficiency or proximity to the market,
could offer its product at a lower price. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking
Co., 386 US. 685 (1967); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961). In
extreme situations, the small firm's products may never enter the "flow of interstate
commerce." Thus the jurisdictional threshold of the Act will not be met, and the small
firm is free to offer discriminatory prices. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S.
186 (1974).
88132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942).
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joyed. Since the plaintiff, however, would not have been injured within
the intendment of the Act by the acceptance of a bid from either of
Southern's two competitors, the court held that it could not have been
injured by the acceptance of Southern's bid of an equally low amount.8 9
Additional circumstances may exist which further restrict the right
of a private plaintiff to recover. For example, in inviting bids, a buyer
may stipulate that he makes no assurances that the lowest bidder will
receive the contract.90 This is especially true when price is not the
principal consideration. Thus, an allegation of injury by a disappointed
seller may fail as being too speculative.91 Likewise, where a plaintiff-
seller has failed to submit a bid and there is no evidence that the de-
fendant was responsible for that failure, no liability will be imposed. 92
The plaintiff must show that it was an illegal discriminatory price that
was responsible for his loss of business and not his own failure to act
or a buyer's cautious policies. Finally, in a closed bidding situation, a
seller who was not invited to bid cannot successfully impose Robinson-
Patman liability upon his victorious competitor.93 The plaintiff was
not injured by the defendant's otherwise unlawful conduct, since the
excluded seller would not have received the lost business in any event.
A possible exception, however, might be the situation in which invita-
tions to bid are based on preliminary price quotes.
THE MEET-COMPETITION DEFENSE
Once there is evidence of a price differential, competitive injury,
and a nexus linking the two, the defendant seller has the burden of
asserting a justification for his lower bid. Rarely will the cost justifica-
89 Id. at 429.
9o See AJ. Goodman & Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890 (D.
Mass. 1949).
91 Id. at 893. In preparing to submit a bid for a state contract, the plaintiff in
Goodman entered into a contract with the defendant whereby the latter would furnish
it with paint for $1.85 per gallon. After plaintiff submitted its bid, the defendant for-
warded its own bid to the state, quoting a price of $1.75 per gallon. The district court
refused to sustain a Robinson-Patman charge for lack of evidence of a primary-line injury.
The court first pointed out that there were no assurances that had plaintiff been
the lowest bidder it would have been awarded the contract. Even if there were such
assurances and even if the defendant had offered the paint to the state for the same
price that it did to the plaintiff, the defendant's bid would still in all likelihood have
been lower than any price the plaintiff could have bid without foregoing a profit. Id.
"The contract would already be lost to plaintiff, and the fact that defendant lowered
his price still further so that it was either discriminatory or unreasonably low in itself,
could add nothing to the injury." Id.
92 Power Replacements Corp. v. Air Preheater Co., 356 F. Supp. 872, 890 (E.D. Pa.
1973); see text accompanying notes 121-25 infra.
9SSee White, Workshop, Pricing and the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 ANTrrRusr LJ.
147, 163 (1971). See also note 30 supra.
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tion defense be employed because of the difficulty in proving that a
reduction in costs was realized in dealing with the particular purchaser,
thereby warranting the price reduction. 4 Thus, a good number of re-
ported Robinson-Patman cases turn on the section 2(b)95 "meet-compe-
tition" defense. To utilize this defense, the defendant must prove that
his discriminatory price was a good faith response to an equally low
price of a competitor.
Since the goal of a seller in a bidding contest is to submit an offer
which underprices his competitor by as little as possible, the meet-com-
petition defense would appear to be a logical starting point for a seller
who seeks to justify his conduct. It is a fundamental principle of the
defense, however, that since a price reduction justified under section
2(b) still discriminates in favor of one purchaser, it may only be made
defensively, 90 i.e., as a response to a lower price of a competitor. Be-
cause of the particular nature of bidding, a number of problems arise
under this broad rule. First, some authority exists for the proposition
that a defensive price cut may only be made to retain present custom-
ers and not to obtain new business.97 Three circuits, however, have
expressly rejected this distinction.9" Second, the price reduction may
only "meet but not beat" the competition.99 Finally, before offering the
94 CAliLUx, supra note 4, § 28.1(c)(1), at 978-79; EDWFASD, supra note 7, at 591-601.
But see PAT=AN, supra note 2, at 75.
Section 2(a) expressly allows price differentials which mirror actual savings to the
seller in his cost of manufacturing, selling, or distributing. Unfortunately, due to the
variety of cost accounting problems involved, the defense has proved illusory, having
been described as "a bonanza for the accountants, but fool's gold for the affluent respon-
dent." Rowe, The Robinson-Patman Act- Thirty Years Thereafter, 80 ABA ANrrRusT
SEC. 9, 12 (1966). Nonetheless, quantity discounts are permissible, provided the price re-
ductions correspond to the seller's cost avoidance.
If quantity discounts are effectively available to all purchasers, little attention will
be paid to their relation to cost savings. If a particular discount, however, requires the
purchase of such large quantities that it is in essence placed beyond the reach of smaller
buyers, the FTC and the courts will deem such a quantity discount to be discriminatory
within the meaning of the Act. If the proper causal connection is established, the seller
is then forced to justify the price. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1948);
Ausu'r, supra note 9, at 21.
95 15 US.C. § 13b) (1970).
906 See EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 550-51.
97 The strict interpretation of the "meet but not beat" rule has led the Second
Circuit and the FTC to hold that a lower price which goes beyond retaining old cus-
tomers and attracts new ones is too aggressive to be within the § 2(b) defense. See Stan-
dard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 861 U.S. 826
(1959); Steele, Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act-Rules for Meeting Competi-
tion in the Past and the Present, 13 AN=TRusr BuLL. 1223, 1247-50 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Steele]. This distinction between old and new customers was rejected in Sun-
shine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 806 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962). See text accompanying notes
101-09 infra.
98 See notes 105-08 & accompanying text infra.
99 See Steele, supra note 97, at 1239-44.
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discriminatory price, a seller must make a good faith verification of the
competitor's price which he is allegedly meeting-10o
Old Customers, but Not New Ones
It has been held that a seller may rely upon the 2(b) defense only
when he is competing for the business of a purchaser with whom he has
previously dealt.1 1 Since meeting competition has been interpreted as
a defensive measure, 10 2 a price reduction which is given to attract new
customers has been deemed too aggressive to fall within the purview
of the section.103 This is the view expressed by the Commission and
the Second Circuit. 04 The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected this dis-
tinction as economically unsound in Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 10 5
finding that such an interpretation would be responsible for a forced
price discrimination between a seller's current and prospective custom-
ers.10 While this significant holding has been expressly followed by
the Ninth0' and Fifthl s8 Circuits, the FTC has not acquiescedO 9
Meet but Not Beat
The "meet but not beat" rule prohibits a seller from undercutting
a competitor's price when seeking to comply with the meet-competi-
100 Id. at 1254; La Rue, Meeting Competition or Price Fixing? Appearances Are Often
Deceiving, 54 Cm. B. REc. 335, 340-41 (1973).
101 See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 242 (1950) ("[W]herever a lawful
lower price of a competitor threatens to deprive a seller of a customer, the seller, to
retain that customer, may in good faith meet that lower price') (emphasis added); Stan-
dard Motor Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826
(1959) ("ifit is well settled that a lowered price is within § 2(b) .. only if it is used
defensively to hold customers rather than to gain new ones'). See generally Steele, supra
note 97, at 1247.
102EDwARDS, supra note 7, at 550-51.
103 CALLMAN, supra note 4, § 28.1(c)(2), at 993.
104 See note 97 supra.
105 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962).
106 That the distinction between old and new customers is economically unsound
and would defeat the purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act seems obvious. If,
in situations where the Section 2(b) proviso is applicable, sellers could grant
good faith competitive price reductions only to old customers in order to retain
them, competition for new customers would be stifled and monopoly would be
fostered. ... Moreover, the distinction would create a forced price discrimina-
tion between a seller's existing customers to whom he had lawfully lowered his
prices under Section 2(b) and a prospective new customer. These results, we be-
lieve, are incompatible with the purpose for which the Robinson-Patman Act
was enacted.
Id. at 52.
107 Cadigan v. Texaco, Inc., 492 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1974).
108 Hanson v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Indus., Inc., 482 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1973).
109 See 1 TPADE REG. REP. $ 3345.52 (1971). In a release dated November 23, 1962,
the Commission stated that because of the particular facts in Sunshine Biscuits it would
not seek review of the court's decision. However, the FTC noted that it had not changed
its position on the question of law involved therein. Id.
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tion defense; the seller's otherwise unlawful price may be as low as his
competitor but not lower.110 Since the admitted goal of a seller engaged
in competitive bidding is to beat and not merely to meet his competi-
tor's price, an immediate hurdle is encountered in reliance upon the
meet-competition defense. The "meet but not beat" rule contemplates
a situation where a seller may have been dealing with a particular cus-
tomer for some time. A new seller arriving upon the scene might be
able lawfully to offer a lower price. Absent the meet-competition de-
fense, the Robinson-Patman Act would tie the regular seller's hands
and prevent him from meeting the more attractive price. Courts have
held that while section 2(b) authorizes a seller to reduce his price to
equal that of his newly arrived competitor, it is not a carte blanche
for a price war between the two."1
In the context of bidding, this requirement loses a great deal of
its meaning. Bidding is a "winner-take-all" proposition in which the
purchaser will generally select the seller with the lowest bid." 2 Per-
mitting a seller to meet the last bid of his competitor, but go no lower,
effectively deprives him of the opportunity to be awarded the contract.
Fortunately, the FTC has shown considerable understanding of the
dilemma faced by a seller caught in this situation. In Beatrice Foods
Co.," 3 the relentless "meet but not beat" requirement was relaxed in
a market which employed competitive bidding. Strict compliance with
the rule in a situation in which the seller had otherwise exhibited
every element of good faith was held to be unreasonable." 4
In Beatrice, respondent, a large dairy company, was engaged in an
informal bidding contest for the private label business of the Kroger
retail stores. Based on misrepresentation of other seller's bids by the
Kroger representative, Beatrice ultimately lowered its original bid to
the point where Kroger received the more than 20 percent discount it
had sought." 5 Although the Commission found secondary-line injury
110 See generally Ausurw, supra note 9, at 99-100; Steele, supra note 97, at 1239-44.
Since the meet-competition provision is designed as strictly a defensive measure, it is
axiomatic that the response be limited to restoring an equal position vis-A-vis the com-
peting seller by meeting his lower price. Any further reduction would be deemed too
aggressive and not within the sanction of § 2(b). See CALaAN, supra note 4, § 28.1(c)(2),
at 992.
111 See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
112But see Power Replacements Corp. v. Air Preheater Co., 356 F. Supp. 872 (E.D.
Pa. 1973) (under certain circumstances a higher bid will be accepted). For a discussion
of this case, see text accompanying notes 121-24 infra.
'11 [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE R G. Rm. 19,045 (FTC 1969).
114 Id. at 21,308.
11 In 1961, Kroger decided to investigate private label sales of milk and other
dairy products in the hope of increasing both its profits and competitive strength. It
invited bids from several companies with respect to prices of milk to be bottled under
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stemming from the discriminatory prices contained in the final bid, 1 6
it held that Beatrice established a good meet-competition defense de-
spite the fact that its prices actually "beat" the competition." 7 The
Commission found that
[p]recisely meeting the exact prices of competitive bids can have no
realistic meaning in the context of this case .... This was a win-
ner-take-all bidding situation.... Furthermore, exact comparabil-
ity of price would have been impossible to achieve given the
circumstances of the bidding procedure used here .... 118
It was the Commission's belief that to require strict compliance with
the rule
would be effectively to outlaw such bidding situations by insisting
upon an artificial and rigid test.... [P]rotection of competition un-
der the Robinson-Patman Act can be accomplished in such cases by
focusing on other questions (such as the responsibility of the buy-
ers not to exceed the permissible bounds of bargaining) .... 119
As a result of this alternative focus, Kroger, the buyer that misrepre-
sented other competitive bids, was held to be in violation of section
2(f) for knowingly inducing illegal prices. 20
The liberality of the Beatrice holding would appear to have been
contradicted by a more recent district court opinion. In Power Replace-
ments Corp. v. Air Preheater Co.,121 the plaintiff challenged the virtual
Kroger's own label. The first bid received amounted to just under an 11% discount
from prevailing prices. In January 1962, Beatrice, hearing rumors of Iroger's bid pro-
curements, arranged a meeting with the representatives of the large food chain. At that
meeting, Beatrice officials, after being asked if they were prepared to make an offer,
replied that they were considering a 15% discount. Mr. Casserly, Kroger's representative,
told them that their discount was not enough, as he already had in his possession a
bid representing a 20% reduction.
On January 18, 1962, Casserly informed the dairy companies that the bidding could
involve gross sales in excess of two million dollars and that his company was considering
receiving reduced services which would eliminate certain distribution costs. Three weeks
thereafter, Beatrice submitted its first proposal, which amounted to a sliding discount
of between 16% and 18%. Although Kroger had not received a better offer, the bid
was rejected. Between February and March, the other companies submitted various bids
which were at times below Beatrice's first bid. In mid-March, during the course of an-
other meeting, Beatrice quoted a 22.3% discount, conditioned upon approval by the
Chicago office. Approval was forthcoming in April, Kroger accepted the bid, and the
companies began operating under the contract in June. Id. at 21,289-96.
116 Id. at 21,803, citing United Biscuit Co. of America v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615 (7th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 926 (1966).
117 [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,045, at 21,808.
118 Id.; see note 115 supra.
119 1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. EPm'. 19,045, at 21,308.
120d. at 21,312. The Commission's finding of a § 2(') violation was affirmed in
Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). See text
accompanying notes 141-56 infra for a discussion of potential buyer liability.
121 356 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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monopoly of the replacement units market enjoyed by the defendant,
the original equipment manufacturer. In a series of informal bidding
contests, the plaintiff offered a price it knew to be substantially below
the defendant's list price. Pursuant to its attorneys' instructions,122 the
defendant countered by modifying its bids to offer the replacement
units at a price nominally higher than the plaintiff's. Based on pur-
chaser preference for the more established brand, the contracts were
repeatedly awarded to the defendant. Notwithstanding the defendant's
higher bids, the district court rejected the defendant's meet-competi-
tion defense on the ground that its bids in effect beat the competitor's
price. The court's paradoxical holding was based primarily on con-
sumer preference for the defendant's product:
[l]n judging whether the seller has met rather than beaten his
competition, we must do more than make a superficial dollar and
cents comparison between the discriminatory price and the assumed
competitive price. Since Air Preheater's product commands a pre-
mium in the replacement element market, it can illegally beat the
price levels of Power Replacements even if it studiously obeyed
the instructions of its attorneys. 23
While the district court did not cite Beatrice, the decision implicitly
rejects the FTC's view that competitive bidding requires unique treat-
ment in regard to the "meet but not beat" rule. Worse yet, the court
provided an additional qualification to the criticized rule: a higher
price may at times "beat" a lower one because of customer preference
for an established brand. Nevertheless, Power Replacements involved
an unusual situation and it is easily distinguishable on its facts. For
years, the defendant had a virtual monopoly in the particular market.
The entrance of the plaintiff was the only effective competition the
defendant had faced. Through its strategy of bidding slightly above its
new competitor, Power Replacements could assure itself of contract
awards because of strong customer preference. Furthermore, there were
repeated instances of commercially unfair acts.124 Perhaps the case
122 After a 1965 settlement of a Robinson-Patman and Sherman Antitrust Act suit
in California, brought by the same plaintiff, defendant's attorneys advised that the fol-
lowing guidelines should be used in any situation where there existed the possibility of
competing against plaintiff: (I) defendant should never sell below cost; (2) defendant
should not attempt, prior to submitting its own bid, to learn what price plaintiff was
quoting; (2) if it believed that it was bidding against plaintiff, defendant could quote
off its list price but should try to quote higher than the bid it anticipated plaintiff
would make; and (4) defendant must not malign plaintiff's products. Id. at 881.
123Id. at 898.
124 For example, Power Replacements warned customers that boiler manufacturers
would blame failures on the use of nonoriginal replacement parts sold by plaintiff,
threatened to discontinue other services unless its products were used, implied that plain-
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would have been more appropriately limited to considering violations
of section 2 of the Sherman Act.125 Absent strong evidence of predatory
intent, the view expressed in Beatrice seems preferable.
Good Faith Verification
In order to establish a meet-competition defense, the seller must
make a good faith verification of the allegedly lower price before re-
sponding by offering a discriminatory price. 126 Recent trends, however,
indicate an easing of the verification requirements. The standard of
good faith is becoming increasingly more subjective in nature.127 Ac-
companying this trend has been an increased emphasis upon buyer
liability under section 2(f).128 A balance is thus being struck which
tiff's product could not perform as well, and falsely represented that its higher price
was due to continual research and development costs. Id. at 890-93.
125 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). Section two applies to situations in which a firm is found
to possess monopolistic power as a result of willful acquisition or maintenance of exclu-
sive power, as opposed to growth caused by accident, possession of a superior product,
or a high degree of business skill. See generally 1 voN KALINoWsK, supra note 19, § 7.01
et seq. The forbidden practices were found to exist in Power Replacements, and conse-
quently, a charge based on § 2 was sustained. Power Replacements Corp. v. Air Preheater
Co., 356 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
126 Before a competitor's price can be met, a seller is required to verify in good faith
that the lower price existed or that he had sufficient reason to believe that it did. How
far this verification must go has been the center of considerable debate. A seller who
simply relied upon the information provided by his customer was held not to have satis-
fied the good faith requirement in Viviano Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.
1969). The court explained that respondent was under a duty to verify the buyer's price
information and to weigh the credibility of the source in light of the "tendency of
buyers to secure the most advantageous terms of sales possible." Id. at 259.
In Surprise Brassiere Co. v. FTC, 406 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1969), the court rejected
a contention that the FTC's hearing examiner erred as a matter of law by requiring
specific foreknowledge as to every detail of the competitor's price allowances before the
seller could use his § 2(b) defense. Verification of reports of competitive price reduc-
tions was not an "undue burden" in providing what the court felt was a necessary
showing of diligence in ascertaining facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent
person to believe that he was in fact meeting his competition. Id. at 715-16.
127 See, e.g., Jones v. Borden Co., 430 F.2d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 1970) (rigid test aban-
doned in favor of a "standard of a 'reasonable and prudent person' attempting to meet
his competitor's prices"); Beatrice Foods Co. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
RPP. 19,045, at 21,307 (FTC 1969).
128 See Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971);
Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 908 (1967);
Beatrice Foods Co. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REo. REP. l 19,045 (FTC 1969).
In Beatrice, the Commission held that a point is reached at which the buyer is bargain-
ing "too hard," thereby shifting Robinson-Patman liability onto himself.
Kroger [the buyer] bargained "too hard" in total disregard of its Robinson-
Patman obligations, and not because it took advantage of a weak seller. It is
usually the seller's obligation to observe compliance with Robinson-Patman, but
there is a point which is reached by continuing pressure by the buyer when the
latter begins to bear some liability if Robinson-Patman limits are exceeded. In
this case, Kroger exceeded these limits by giving a false impression that a com-
petitor had offered a 20% discount and when it failed to convey any correct
information about quotedprices.
Id. at 21,312.
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prevents any possible dilution of the Act. The seller may now estab-
lish his defense more easily, while the buyer's potential liability to the
injured party is increasing. Where a buyer unlawfully induces the dis-
crimination, he, and not the seller should bear the burden.129 Nonethe-
less, the good faith requirement is still viable, and a seller who slashes
his prices without diligent fact finding will surely fail in establishing
his defense.
The Beatrice decision provides a model for the type of verification
appropriate in an informal open bidding situation. The Commission
noted that representatives of the company "made specific investigations,
tested rumors and tried by legitimate means to find out what competi-
tors were doing .... "130 Furthermore, they sought information from
the buyer inducing the reduction and had no reason to believe that the
data supplied was untrue.' 31 Accordingly, no finding of liability was
justified.
The greatest difficulty with verification lies in the area of com-
pletely sealed bidding which, unlike the Beatrice procedure, leaves no
room for reasonable reliance on buyer representations. It is question-
able whether the courts will be willing to reduce the seller's affirma-
tive burden when no other potentially liable party is available.
Moreover, the seller is left in the unenviable position of trying to es-
tablish his good faith amid circumstances which foreclose any real pos-
sibility of his having verified knowledge of the competitive bids. While
the courts may recognize the difficulties of precisely evaluating other
prices, a bidder should nevertheless attempt to accurately gauge the
range of offers of other contestants. One commentator has suggested
that the best approach for a seller faced with the dilemma of having
to verify competitors' prices in a sealed bidding contest is to "make a
detailed analysis of what is going on in the market where his customer
is located."'1 32
Prior to the current relaxation of the verification requirements, it
had been suggested that a seller who is unable to confirm a reported
12D [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,045, at 21,308.
If businessmen are not to be prohibited entirely from bargaining in such a
situation, the burden of not exceeding Robinson-Patman bounds should, at some
point, fall on the buyer who plays the cards so close to his vest as to persuade
the seller to come down just a little more, and not on the seller who has tried
every proper means to feel out the opposition.
Id.
130 Id. at 21,307.
131 Id.
182 White, Workshop, Pricing and the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 AN-rrRusr L.J. 147,
161-62 (1971).
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price quote should contact his competitor directly.1 3 While such con-
tact would expeditiously enable the seller to comply with the good
faith requirement, it may well raise the specter of Sherman Act liabil-
ity for conspiring to fix prices.13 4 Not surprisingly, in United States v.
Container Corp. of America,135 the Supreme Court held that an ex-
change of price information between competitors may in some instances
amount to a Sherman Act violation. 18 6
It has been said that while several Robinson-Patman principles
"coexist restlessly alongside the Sherman Act," the strict duty to verify
demanded by the FTC and several courts "threaten[s] complete irrec-
oncilability."'137 As a result of Container Corp., the consensus was that
no seller should ever make a direct inquiry of his competitor. Two
circuits, however, have subsequently resolved some of the uncertainty
by holding that direct verification is not violative of the Sherman Act
when necessarily required for the purpose of complying with section
2(b).138 Nonetheless, caution should still be exercised outside the Ninth
133 See La Rue, Meeting Competition or Price-Fixing? Appearances Are Often De-
ceiving, 54 Cm. B. REc. 335, 340 (1973), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-528 (Dec. 21, 1974).
134 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
135 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
136 Whenever one seller was unable to certify a report of a competitor's price offer,
a designated employee would contact the alleged offeror for the sole purpose of verifi-
cation. Conversation would be strictly limited to mentioning the suspect price, eliciting
in turn either an affirmative or negative answer. Never were the merits of the particular
price discussed, nor was there any formal agreement between the manufacturers to provide
this information. Prices were nonetheless exchanged reciprocally. One would provide the
desired information in expectation of the solicitor's mutual cooperation whenever it was
required. Id. at 335.
The Court held that any "intereference with the setting of price by free market
forces is unlawful per se." Id. at 337. It called attention to the fact that information was
exchanged concerning specific offers to individual customers and was not merely a sta-
tiscal survey of average prices. Id. at 384.
The Court noted that price exchanges would be permitted only in the presence of
a "controlling circumstance," such as fraudulent buyer representations against which
sellers attempt to protect themselves. See Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States,
268 US. 588 (1925). In Container Corp., no fraudulent inducement was alleged, and
therefore, the manufacturers could not take advantage of the exception.
137 See Eaton, The Robinson-Patman Act: Reconciling the Meeting Competition De-
fense with the Sherman Act, 18 ANTrrrusT BULL. 411, 424 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Eaton].
188 In Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928
(1972), the court permitted direct verification in the absence of any "controlling circum-
stance." See note 136 supra. The case was distinguishable from Container Corp. by the
fact that the seller's prices were publicly available, having been set forth in trade
journals, whereas in the corrugated container industry, they were available from no
other source but the manufacturers themselves. Furthermore, Texaco made its prices
available to everyone, regardless of reciprocity. 455 F.2d at 181. The court held that
Texaco's actions were motivated by compliance with the meet-competition defense and
were without antitrust implications.
By seeking verification Texaco was simply complying with the requirements laid
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and Tenth Circuits by any seller who contacts his competition in the
absence of any evidence of buyer misrepresentation. In view of Con-
tainer Corp., he could find himself walking a "tightrope."' 139 Indeed,
in the future, courts may find that a conflict exists between further
relaxation of the verification requirement and permitting a seller to
verify prices directly. As the verification requirement is eased, any seller
who resorts to direct contact may well be regarded as overzealously ful-
filling his Robinson-Patman obligations, thus leaving himself open to
possible Sherman Act liability. 40 On the other hand, in light of recent
decisions finding no Sherman Act liability, the courts and the FTC
may begin to tighten the verification requirements again and expect a
seller, when all else fails, to resort to direct communication.
down in Federal Trade Commission v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. That is,
Texaco was attempting to confirm the reports of its retail outlets that their
competitors had lowered their prices. This much would be necessary before
Texaco could lower its prices and still be within the "meeting competition"
defense.
Id. at 182.
The Ninth Circuit, in Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742 (1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 943 (1973), seemed unconcerned with distinguishing the price exchange involved
therein from the situation in Container Corp. The court simply held that the latter
case did not forbid every exchange of price information, whether performed "pursuant
to an agreement or a reciprocal understanding." 469 F.2d at 746. According to the
court, the jury had been properly instructed to consider the defendant's purpose in
exchanging price information. Id. at 747. It also pointed out that only after exhausting
every other means did the defendant resort to direct communication to verify the
reportedly lower prices. Id.
In Di-Wal, Inc. v. Fibreboard Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. 73-155 (N.D. Cal. 1970), a
wallboard manufacturer, who participated in an almost identical price exchange as that
involved in Container Corp., was charged with conspiring to fix or stabilize prices. In
dismissing the purchasers' complaint, the district court found that the requests for price
information and subsequent disclosures had been conducted in order to enable the de-
fendant and its competitors to meet the good faith requirement of the Robinson-Patman
Act. Id. at 88,557. The exchanges were not made as part of a conspiracy to restrain
trade. Id. at 88,558. The court ignored the fact that there was no "controlling circum-
stance" and took no pains to distinguish the case from Container Corp. In Wall Prods.
Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971), the same court placed
the wallboard industry practice of direct verification of prices within an exception estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 588 (1925). The Wall Products court finding that the sellers were confronted with
customer misrepresentation, held that "[n]o court is required by the Sherman Act to
foster 'competition' procured by fraud and misrepresentation, and the Sherman Act does
not prohibit a defendant from protecting itself therefrom." 326 F. Supp. at 315. The court
was not at all troubled by the fact that the verification calls had a tendency to check the
decline of prices that had already begun. According to the court, the inference to be
drawn was that verification calls "were made for the purpose of complying with the
Robinson-Patman Act and as a means of protection against false representations by
customers." Id. at 311. As a consequence, no violation of the Sherman Act was found to
have resulted from the practice of directly verifying prices.
139 See Eaton, supra note 137, at 430.
140 Id.
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BUYER LI&BmTY
During the first 35 years of the Act, FTC enforcement of the buyer
liability provisions141 was infrequent. 142 In order to be liable under
section 2(f), the buyer must have knowingly induced or received an il-
legal price. K-nowledge as a prerequisite to liability was strongly em-
phasized by the Supreme Court in Automatic Canteen Co. of America
v. FTC.1 43 Moreover, the burden of proving this culpable knowledge
was placed on the Commission or private party plaintiff.144 This re-
flected the Court's fear that vigorous prosecution of section 2(f) could
go beyond the Act, lead to price uniformity,145 and place a buyer at his
peril whenever he engaged in price bargaining.146
Because of Automatic Canteen, section 2(f) for a time "was rele-
gated to the limbo of nonuse." 147 The situation has now changed.
Buyers, who through aggressive bargaining realize material price con-
cessions from suppliers quick to improve disappointing sales, may now
face section 2(f) problems. 14 As a result of Kroger Co. v. FTC,149 an
appeal from the Commission's findings of a section 2(f) violation by
Kroger in the Beatrice case, buyers apparently will be held to a higher
standard of honesty in their negotiations.150 Furthermore, Kroger spe-
cifically rejects the contention that there must first be a section 2(a)
violation before a section 2(f) charge can be made.'5" Thus, regardless
141 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1970).
142 See Klein, Hard Bargaining Under § 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 32 Omo
ST. LJ. 734 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Klein]. In the first 35 years of the Act's existence,
there was less than 50 § 2(f) complaints filed. Id. at 734 n.2
143 346 U.S. 61 (1958).
144 Id. at 81. Since trade experience can indirectly provide such knowledge, the
Court held that an inference of the required scienter would be permissible under the
following circumstances:
[A] buyer who knows that he buys in the same quantities as his competitor and
is served by the seller in the same manner or with the same amount of exertion
as the other buyer can fairly be charged with notice that a substantial price
differential cannot be justified.
Id. at 80.
145 Id. at 63.
146 Id. at 73.
147 KrrNaR, supra note 8, at 256.
148 See Klein, supra note 142, at 734.
149 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
150 Eaton, supra note 137, at 427.
Buyers may be held to a new standard after Kroger Co. v. FTC ... one termed
"truth in bargaining" by former Commissioner Elman. Negotiating deception
could be curtailed by this specter of Robinson-Patman liability.
Id.
151438 F.2d at 1377.
The Commission found that Beatrice made a bona fide attempt to meet the
Broughton bid which it was told by Kroger was the lower one. In so doing
Beatrice was in good faith acting within a defense offered by section 2(b). On
the other hand, Kroger knew that the Broughton bid was not lower and that
the one of Beatrice was, therefore, not in fact responsive to an actual lower bid.
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of the culpability of the seller, a buyer can be charged with knowledge
that the discriminatory prices he received could not possibly be cost
justified by the seller and were therefore illegal. 15 2
The recent emphasis upon buyer liability has alleviated some of
the problems encountered in price haggling and secret concessions. A
supplier can now place greater reliance upon the representations of
the buyer.1 3 Nevertheless, it would be a reckless seller who would at-
tempt no further verification and thereby risk section 2(a) liability.
Still, in these cases the possibilities of buyer liability are increased,
thereby reducing the probability of buyer misrepresentation.'
In a sealed bidding situation, where the buyer has merely invited
suppliers to submit bids, the possibilities of section 2(f) liability are
minimal. Perhaps, should the buyer receive an unusually low bid from
a seller with whom he has had previous dealings, he could be charged
with having "knowingly ... receive[d] a discrimination in price .... -155
Even if the buyer had. no actual knowledge of the illegality of the bid,
he could be charged with having had sufficient trade experience to
place him on notice of the illegality. 5
CONCLUSION
Bidding and price haggling are often viewed as an ideal manifes-
tation of the competitive process. When properly employed, they en-
courage sellers to offer their goods at the lowest possible profit margin
to the ultimate gain of the American consumer. Nevertheless, the un-
In such a factual situation the seller's successful defense under § 2(b) cannot
exculpate the buyer since Kroger knew that the prices offered by Beatrice and
received by Kroger were not in fact within the defense of section 2(b). To hold
otherwise in this case would put a premium on the buyer's artifice and cunning
in inducing discriminatory prices.
Id.
152 See Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
908 (1967). A retail food chain was found guilty of inducing illegal price discriminations
by initiating a promotional campaign. In order to participate, the suppliers had to
grant substantial price concessions. In affirming the decision of the Commission, the
court agreed that the defendant had knowledge of certain facts of the market which at
the very least could create a reasonable suspicion that the concessions were probably
illegal. It held that under such circumstances a "duty to inquire" whether the suppliers'
price reductions could be cost justified arose. Id. at 365-66. The defendant was charged
with possessing sufficient trade experience to have reason to know the prevailing prices
paid by its specific competitors- a far more stringent standard than that set forth by
the Supreme Court in Automatic Canteen. Id. at 367.
153See Beatrice Foods Co. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,045
(FTC 1969).
154 See id.
155 15 U.S.C. § 13(* (1970).
15 See, e.g., Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372, 1378 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 871 (1971); Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 851, 365-67 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 908 (1967).
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certainties which the Robinson-Patman Act present may discourage the
use of these pro-competitive devices and lead to stagnation within pric-
ing structures.
The evil at which the Act is aimed is not price reduction, but
rather, reductions to one buyer and not to another. A seller may not
rob Peter to pay Paul. But bidding by its nature demands price dis-
crimination. The seller is asked to give his lowest possible price, not
his usual list price. The pressure for a reduction is great, since only
one seller will prevail.
In an effort to aid the seller caught in the inevitable conflict be-
tween the commercial necessities of competitive bidding and the Rob-
inson-Patman Act, the following guidelines are proposed. They must
be read in light of the differences among the circuits, the possibilities
of change in FTC enforcement policies, and the potential for some-
what groundless suits by disgruntled competitors.
1. A seller may always enter into a bidding contest when
he intends to bid a list, or otherwise nondiscriminatory price.
2. A seller may not submit bids to particular customers
which "are consistently lower than its prices to others who are
competitors of such favored customers unless it can justify
such differences by differences in cost .... -157
3. A seller may not submit bids which are consistently
lower when bidding against a particular competitor, unless
cost justified.
4. In bidding for the business of a new customer, any
discriminatory price offered to meet the price of a competitor
should only be submitted with full awareness of the attendant
risks outside the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. s
5. Sales personnel should be required to maintain ac-
curate records of the following information: (a) competitors'
price lists or other published pricing policies; (b) written or
oral statements by a purchaser describing competitive offers
including name, time, and amount where possible; and (c)
general knowledge of competitors' pricing policies obtained
through field personnel. This information should be carefully
reviewed before deciding on a bid price and a record of the in-
formation relied upon should be entered into the file.
6. When downward revisions of an already submitted
bid are contemplated, the buyer should be requested to sup-
157 Quaker Oats Co., 66 F.T.C. 1131, 1183 (1964) (hearing examiner).
158 See text accompanying notes 101-09 supra.
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ply the following information in writing: (a) a copy of the
competitor's price quote or most recent invoice; (b) in the al-
ternative, a written statement describing the competitor's of-
fer; or (c) failing that, a record should be made of specific oral
statements made by the buyer fully describing the competi-
tor's offer. Only when the prior course -of dealing indicates
that the buyer's representations are reliable should a discrim-
inatory reduction be made based on the mere assertion by the
buyer that the seller's bid is higher than that of its competi-
tor's.
7. If the seller can clearly establish either of the follow-
ing facts, it is then free to charge whatever the circumstances
justify: (a) the presence of a condition designated in section
2(a) which affects the marketability of the goods, e.g., pending
obsolescence; or (b) the fact that the reductions were fully jus-
tified by attendant cost savings in dealing with a particular
customer.
As precarious as a bidding seller's position may now be, there have
been indications that it may worsen. In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co.,6 9 a case now pending before the Commission, the FTC has
indicated that, in order to protect both the interest of the consumer
and the competitive environment, an order may be forthcoming con-
taining "restrictions on the use of the competitive bidding process."'u 0
While this Note expresses no opinion concerning the final outcome of
the case, the Commission, in fashioning any remedy, should consider
the competitive benefits of bidding as expressed in its earlier deci-
sions."6 Further, the courts and the FTC must show understanding
for the plight of a seller asked to sell his goods by means of bidding.
The meet-competition defense should be construed to give protection
169 [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,639 (FTC 1971).
160 Id.
In addition to halting the alleged practices, the proposed order stated that if
record facts show that the proposed provisions "might be inadequate fully to
protect the consuming public, or the competitive conditions of the retail grocery
or dairy industries, the Commission may order such other relief as it finds
necessary or appropriate, including restrictions on specific abuses of buying power
in bi-lateral negotiations, restrictions on the use of the competitive bidding pro-
cess, requirements that special price reductions be passed on to the consumer
and to competing retail-purchasers, the posting or publication of net wholesale
prices to A&P, and restriction of vertical integration by A&P into the dairy
industry if it appears that any such provision is necessary or desirable for effec-
tive relief herein."
Id.
161 See Beatrice Foods Co. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,045
(FTC 1969); Quaker Oats Co., 66 F.T.C. 1131 (1964). ,
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to the bidding seller where his actions are not predatory, and his dis-
criminations neither consistently favor one buyer nor disadvantage one
competitor.
P. Kevin Castel
Anthony R. Daniele
